It took nearly two decades of advocacy by the defense bar, but the Seventh Circuit has now become the first federal circuit court to find that a text message is not considered a call under the TCPA. In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a proposed class action based on marketing texts, concluding that 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) only authorizes suits for unwanted telephone calls — not unwanted text messages. 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026). The decision comes 17 years after the Ninth Circuit became the first federal circuit to address this issue, finding in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009), that a text message is a “call” for purposes of the TCPA, and after many courts long ago concluded that this was a settled issue. The Seventh Circuit ruling in Steidinger creates a circuit split, with the Ninth Circuit having recently affirmed its position in Howard v. Republican National Committee, 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026), paving the way for a showdown in the Supreme Court. But in the near term, it means that there is no private right of action under the TCPA for unsolicited text messages available to litigants in the Seventh Circuit, which is a big win for defendants.
In Steidinger, the plaintiffs alleged that Blackstone Medical Services sent marketing text messages and made calls promoting home sleep tests despite requests to stop further communications and, in some instances, despite enrollment in the National Do-Not-Call Registry. The plaintiffs brought claims under the TCPA’s do-not-call provisions, but the district court dismissed the federal claims, concluding that Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA authorizes suits for unwanted telephone calls, but not text messages.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision turned on a single issue: whether text messages are telephone calls within the meaning of Section 227(c)(5). Looking to the ordinary meaning of a “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991, the court concluded that it does not. Steidinger, 2026 WL 2028517, at *2. The court observed that contemporary dictionary definitions described a telephone as an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance and a call as an attempt to communicate by telephone. Id. Because text messaging did not exist when the TCPA was enacted and because text messages do not involve the reproduction of sound, the court determined that modern text messages are better understood as “messages” rather than “calls.”
The court emphasized that while statutes may apply to new technologies, courts must remain faithful to the statutory terms Congress actually used. Id. at *2-3 Applying that principle, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the ordinary meaning of “telephone” could not be expanded to encompass text messages within Section 227(c)(5). Id. at *3. The court also relied heavily on the structure of the TCPA itself. Other provisions of Section 227 refer to “telephone solicitations,” which Congress defined as a “telephone call or message” made for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of goods or services. By contrast, Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action only for the receipt of more than one “telephone call” within a 12-month period. The court reasoned that Congress made a conscious decision by using different terminology in the TCPA. Id. In other words, had Congress intended otherwise, it could have used broader language.
Such a ruling from the Seventh Circuit would have been unthinkable as recently as a couple of years ago because the federal courts felt obliged to defer to the FCC, which has long taken the position that a text message is a “call.” But in the wake of McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025), courts are no longer bound by agency interpretations and are looking at these issues with fresh eyes. While some courts have held to the view that text messages should be considered calls, many have not and now the Seventh Circuit has staked out its position.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision obviously represents a significant development for businesses defending against TCPA claims. Plaintiffs frequently rely on Section 227(c)(5) when challenging marketing communications sent to consumers who have requested not to be contacted. Following Steidinger, such claims are off the table in the Seventh Circuit and defendants facing text message claims in other jurisdictions can point to Steidinger to argue that no private cause of action exists under the TCPA.
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling has been a long time coming — and lawyers on the Vedder team have been involved in making this argument for nearly two decades. But the Seventh Circuit significantly narrowed the scope of the TCPA’s private right of action, making it much less likely that companies will unknowingly find themselves subject to claims for up to $1,500 in statutory damages per text message. Still, companies engaged in telemarketing, consumer outreach, and SMS-based advertising should continue to monitor whether other courts adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, whether the Supreme Court takes up this issue, and whether Congress or the FCC responds to what may become a growing divide in TCPA enforcement.
The article was authored by Shareholder Bryan Clark and law clerk Tom Kavanagh.
*Tom Kavanagh is a Law Clerk. A Law Clerk is not licensed to practice law and is supervised by Vedder Price P.C. attorneys licensed and in good standing.
